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3.1 Introduction
The successful transfer and eventual implementation of a policy is heavily 
dependent on the relationship between the context from which it came 
and that to which it is transferred. In Chapter 2, Vinke-de Kruijf and Özerol 
elaborates on the numerous ways in which this relationship is understood 
and analysed by different streams of literature. This chapter will provide a 
thorough explanation of one theoretical lens, which has been used 
extensively to examine water governance and implementation related 
processes: Contextual Interaction Theory (CIT). The basic premise from 
which CIT begins is that context matters, and quite a lot. While Chapter 2 
focuses on the processes associated with the transfer of a policy, CIT is used 
here to provide a way to understand the internal processes that occur once 
the governance actors have decided to move forward to the implementation 
of the chosen policy. The purpose of introducing such a theory here is that 
it provides an analytical framework that helps to assess whether a policy 
transfer contributes to or damages conditions for successful water 
management. This chapter goes beyond addressing the likelihood of policy 
transfers and focuses on the degree of success of such transfers. Once a 
policy transfer is in principle accepted, like water management based at the 
river basin scale or stakeholder participation, it will be confronted with an 
existing governance regime. This confrontation can provide resistance or 
simply encapsulate what is new rather than really change to adapt to the 
new concepts or principles. Further, if the existing arrangements do 
undergo change there is no guarantee that the ideas that worked so well in 
the originating context will be able to contribute to the quality of water 
governance in the new context in which they are being applied.
Within policy studies there are wide ranges of frameworks, theories and 
methodologies available that can be used by researchers and practitioners 
in order to better understand how, when and why the context surrounding 
policies and projects affects inputs, processes and outcomes. CIT places the 
characteristics of the actors involved in the policy process at the centre of 
the analysis and provides a framework within which the influences of the 
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external context can be understood. Through a more detailed understanding 
of how, where and why these actor characteristics are influenced by the 
external context, one can begin to draw some lessons related to effective 
policy transfer in water governance.
In the next section we first explain some basics of the actor-centred 
orientation of this framework and how actor characteristics ultimately 
determine the success of any policy and thus policy transfer. Thereafter the 
layers of context that affect these actors are presented. Policy transfers can 
be viewed as interventions into these contexts that not only need to assume 
their place therein, but also create synergy with existing elements to 
produce tangible improvements.
3.2 Actor characteristics as the ultimate process setting
When policy processes are viewed themselves as social interaction processes 
that are ultimately driven by the actors involved, as they are in Contextual 
Interaction Theory, it makes sense to place them and their main 
characteristics central stage in any analytical model, and to build any further 
explanation of the course and results of the process from that simple 
starting point. Throughout the history of policy implementation research, 
hundreds of crucial success factors have been proposed and used to analyse 
various cases. This can be theoretically interesting when trying to carve out 
the impact of a single factor. Practitioners however deal with situations in 
which numerous factors are simultaneously present and where different 
combinations arise. Even in a rather simple model of fifteen contextual 
factors each having only two possible values there are some 30,000 different 
possible combinations of circumstances. That model is unworkable as an 
analytical tool (Goggin, 1986), and excessive for use in practical analysis.
CIT asserts that since interaction processes are human activities, all 
influences – including those created by policy instruments – will flow via the 
key characteristics of the actors involved. These three characteristics are the 
cognitions, motivations, and power and resources of the actors. This 
approach enables an initial distinction of the inner core factors that is far 
more parsimonious. Figure 3.1 outlines these factors (inputs and outputs of 
the process are not shown in this figure).
The characteristics of the actors in the process are the ultimate driving 
forces of the process, and not mere consequences of the ‘arena’ in which the 
process takes place (cf. Ostrom, 1999). The resources of the actors provide 
them with capacity to act and power in relation to other actors. Motivations 
and cognitions also play an important role in creating productive or non-
productive settings for the process (see also further below). Resources 
become significant to the process when they are connected to cognitions and 
motivations. These three core actor characteristics represent different 
perspectives on social interaction processes and are exceptionally useful in 
explaining the dynamics of such processes (Owens, 2008).
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Figure 3.1  Process model with the actor characteristics used in Contextual 
Interaction Theory.
In this model peope constitute the ‘actors’, both individual and 
collective. Quite often however, these people represent organizations or 
groups and so often these organizations rather than the individual people 
are considered as the ‘actors’. In Chapter 2, four types of actors are 
discerned that play a role in policy transfers, including supranational and 
international actors. In terms of the process, the relevant characteristics 
of representatives are often determined to such a large extent by the 
organization or group that they represent. As a result, a change of the 
individual actor is in most cases not likely to significantly change the 
setting of the process. ‘Where one stands depends on where one sits’ is an 
aphorism already cited by Allison (1971, p. 176) in his classic policy 
analysis. There is however also potential for the characteristics of individual 
people to have an impact in cases where they possess (or lack) diplomatic 
skills, creativity, motivation supported by personal enthusiasm, or where 
productive or destructive ‘chemistry’ exists between the individuals 
involved.
Summarizing this section: Contextual Interaction Theory explains the 
dynamics of social interaction processes and is intended to be simple and 
straightforward (Bressers, 2009). The theory’s first main assertions are:
a Policy processes are not mechanisms, but social interaction processes 
between a set of actors (people, organizations). These policy processes 
include policy transfer processes and project realization.
b Many factors can influence the activities and interactions of these actors 
but only because and in as far as they change relevant characteristics of 
the involved actors.
c These characteristics are: their motives (which drive their actions), 
their cognitions (information held to be true, with which the situation 
is interpreted) and their resources (providing capacity and power) (see 
also Bressers, 2004).
d These three characteristics influence each other, but cannot be restricted 
to two or one without losing much insight (see Bressers, 2009).
e The characteristics of the actors shape the process, but are in turn also 
influenced by the course of and experiences in the process and can 
therefore gradually change during the process.
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3.3 Layers of context and their relevance
The three main actor characteristics are not only intrinsic to the actors 
and influenced by the process, but are also influenced by many external 
factors from a multilayered context. Part of that context is the case-specific 
context. This involves factors like the characteristics of the geographical 
place where the project is realized (Kotzebue et al., 2010). A special 
category is that of the case history consisting of previous decision-making 
and framing. This special type of case history affects the institutional 
arena for the process that influences which actors participate, to what 
extent and with what legal resources and expectations. A further layer of 
context is the structural context, with both the elements of governance 
and the relevant property and use rights (Bressers and Kuks, 2004). Next 
there is a less specified layer of wider contexts, within which the culture, 
and economic and technological developments and political system 
(Brynard, 2005, p. 659) are included.
The structural (governance) context related to for instance the national 
level is much more stable than the specific context, which applies to 
individual cases. The structural context will to a far lesser degree be 
influenced back by individual cases of policy transfer and implementation 
of the transferred options. In fact it is the essence of the difference between 
the specific and the structural context that the latter holds for, in principle, 
all similar cases and not only for any specific case. Nevertheless it too will 
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Figure 3.2  Layers of contextual factors for actor characteristics  
(source: Bressers, 2009).
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with similar dimensions of motivational, cognitive and resource develop-
ments in response to external influences and internal frictions (Bressers 
and Kuks, 2003, p. 74–83; Costejà Florensa, 2003). These developments are 
not always coherent across the various elements of governance (compare 
Howlett and Cashore, 2007). The elements of governance also influence 
each other when new situations are encountered. For instance the degree 
of interconnectedness and cohesion of the network relations influence the 
characteristics of instruments in instrument selection processes (Bressers 
and O’Toole, 1998, 2005; Ligteringen, 1999).
The specific context is not entirely determined by the structural context. 
A lack of interconnectedness and cohesion of the network relations at the 
national governance level need not be replicated among the constellation 
of the actors involved. More generally in the context of a specific case, the 
structural relations between levels, actors, goals, instruments and resources 
will be adapted to the specific case in as far as the actors strive for this and 
it is possible. When the process continues for a longer period of time, or is 
a process in a series of similar processes that together give enough time, this 
adaptation is feasible. It can be worthwhile to attempt to build for instance 
better networked relations among the actors involved in this series of 
processes. Such collaborative policy networks at the case level can have 
important self-reinforcing characteristics (DeLeon and Varda, 2009). The 
strategies used by the actors involved for this ‘metaprocess’ are discussed 
later in this chapter.
The structural context also consists of the valid property and use rights 
system associated with land, water and other relevant resources (e.g. 
Ostrom, 1999). The relevant structural context – or ‘regime’ – is thus a 
combination of both public governance and property and use rights 
(Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Knoepfel et al., 2007) and the related 
exclusion of uses and access granted to users. Policy options for water 
management that can work well in their area of origin can be a complete 
mismatch in another context where the property and use rights related to 
the protection of private land are much stronger.
The ‘five multiplicity aspects of governance’ form an important part of 
the structural context (Bressers and Kuks, 2003). Governance is not used 
here as a normative concept or as a hypothesis of developments in 
government–society relationships (Howlett, 2011, pp. 7–10, see also Chapter 
2 where the concept of ‘good water governance’ is elaborated upon), but as 
a neutral, yet enlarged understanding of the scope of the concept of ‘policy’. 
The five elements of governance take the form of:
1 Scales and levels: governance assumes a multilevel character of all scales 
(jurisdictional, spatial, temporal etc.); in policy transfer processes often 
a transnational or international scale is included.
2 Actors and networks: governance assumes the multi-actor character of 
the relevant network(s).
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3 Perceptions of the problem and goal ambitions (not just the objectives): 
governance assumes the multifaceted character of the problems and 
ambitions.
4 Strategies and instruments: governance assumes the multi-instrumental 
character of the strategies of the actors involved.
5 Resources and responsibilities for implementation: governance assumes 
the complex multiresource basis for implementation.
In the context of a policy being transferred from one water management 
regime to another, these various aspects can guide an analysis of how similar 
and different the important aspects of the two governance contexts are. 
This can provide important insights for understanding how the 
implementation process related to the transferred policy will be influenced 
by the governance regime. In addition to using these aspects to study the 
influences of the structural context, a number of qualities of the governance 
regime can also be analysed and be used to understand its influence on the 
interaction processes. These qualities, extent, coherence, flexibility and 
intensity, are described in the following sections.
Around the structural context there is yet another more encompassing 
wider context circle of political system, sociocultural, economic, technological 
development and problem contexts. Some cultural settings can for instance 
make hierarchical approaches less feasible, or make some degree of social 
control obsolete, (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; 
Wildavsky, 1982).
3.4 Extent and coherence as requirements for effective water 
resource management
The structural context influences the process not only through its direct 
contents, but also though its extent and coherence (Knoepfel et al., 2001, 2003; 
Bressers and Kuks, 2004). The extent is a quality of the regime that refers to 
its completeness. The coherence is a quality that expresses the degree to 
which the various elements of the regime are strengthening rather than 
weakening each other. The success of policy transfers is partly dependent 
on whether these qualities are improved or decreased by the transfer.
A regime increases its extent and consequently becomes more complex 
when more levels and scales are involved, more actors are involved, more 
perceptions of the problem and accompanying goals are involved, more 
instruments are part of the policy mix and more organizations share 
responsibilities for implementation. The most eminent feature of extent is 
however the gradual increase of the domain of the regime, which consists 
of the uses and users regulated by one or more parts of the regime. With 
this also comes an increase in relevant property and use rights. This is then 
viewed as an increase in the crucial variable of extent. Regimes with an 
insufficient extent are by definition weak as guardians of sustainable 
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resource use, since some relevant parts of the domain are unregulated. 
Policy transfers tend to increase the extent of the governance regime, since 
a cognition that important aspects are lacking in relation to the water 
problems at stake can be a main driver to engage in such transfers.
Complexity, as a characteristic of the governance regime, need not be 
harmful to the overall water governance processes present in a particular 
case (de Boer and Bressers, 2011). Logically, growing complexity develops 
as an answer to real needs and issues. Societies in modern times have 
generally grown towards increased complexity. Increased populations, 
borders, overlaps, activities, rivalries etc. are a fact of our current living 
environments. A growing complexity in governance can be viewed as a 
natural adaptation to that development (Gerrits, 2008; Teisman et al., 
2009). Many external change agents, such as technological developments, 
add new scales, new actors, new problem perceptions, new instruments and 
new responsibilities to the existing ones.
While the term ‘integration’ is common in policy papers (e.g. those on 
‘integrated water resources management’), coherence is used here 
instead, for the reason that, in policy papers the term integration (e.g. in 
‘integrated water management’) is used in a sense that implicitly or 
explicitly includes an increase in the domain of the regime (the extent 
increased to all relevant users and uses). Therefore, we believe that 
integration as it is used in the policy sphere is a combination of what we 
call extent and coherence. In Chapter 2, the inherent tension between those 
two aspects in the concept of integrated water resources management 
(IWRM) is described. For the sake of conceptual clarity and the possibility 
of adapting to the meaning of the term integration in policy practice, we 
use the terms extent and coherence when appropriate, and reserve 
‘integration’ for the combination of the two.
When more than one layer of government influences the management 
of the same water or other natural resource (as is often the case), then 
coherence means, among other things, that the activities of these layers of 
government are recognized as mutually dependent and influencing each 
other’s effects. Likewise if more than one governance scale is relevant the 
interaction effects between those scales should be considered. When more 
than one actor (stakeholder) is involved in the policy, coherence means 
that there is a substantial degree of interaction in the policy network; 
preferably productive interaction providing coordination capacity. When 
more than one use or user is causing the problem of unsustainable resource 
use for example, coherence means that the various resulting objectives are 
analysed in one framework so that deliberate choices can be made if and 
when goals and/or uses are conflicting. When the actors involved have 
problem perceptions that start from different angles, coherence means that 
they are capable of integrating these to such an extent that a common 
ground for productive deliberation on ambitions is created. The same 
holds for instrumental strategies that are used to attain the different 
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objectives, as well as for the different instruments in a mix to attain one of 
these objectives. Coherence of the organization of the implementation 
process means that responsibilities and resources are coordinated, or the 
responsible actors themselves are coordinated.
With more coherence in the public governance component of the 
regime, the goals of the actors involved in the process are less likely to be in 
discord. All elements of a more coherent regime can be assumed to 
contribute to a lowered degree of experienced uncertainty, an increase in 
information exchange, and a lower degree of distrust. This implies that a 
more coherent public governance component of the regime can outperform 
a regime with an equal degree of extent, yet more fragmentation. While 
policy transfers are assumed to generally increase the extent and thereby 
the complexity of the governance regime, the coherence with the existing 
elements of governance could actually be lowered rather than raised. In 
such cases, the overall effectiveness of water management will not improve, 
and could be in danger of deteriorating. Hence the degree of ultimate 
success of the policy transfer is also dependent on the degree to which it 
can be introduced in such a way that it improves rather than decreases 
governance coherence.
This leads to some further assertions:
f Regimes with a deficient extent are more likely to lead to a degradation 
of water resources or an inability to protect the ecological functions of 
the resource, than are regimes with a larger extent.
g Regimes with a large extent, but with low coherence are more likely 
to lead to degradation of natural resources or an inability to protect the 
ecological functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar 
extent but a higher degree of coherence.
These last assertions have been tested as hypotheses and generally 
confirmed in a six country, twenty-four cases study on tributary river basin 
management (Bressers and Kuks, 2004). However the relation between the 
growth of the extent of the regime and the improvement of sustainability 
estimates proved to be rather weak and hardly significant. The relation 
between the general assessment of regime change towards more integration 
(extent and coherence taken together) and the assessment of sustainability 
improve ments is however much stronger (Spearman’s rho = 0.533, 
p = 0.004). Of the separate regime aspects, by far the most important factor 
was the coherence of public governance. It correlated even more strongly 
with the assessment of sustainable resource use than the general regime 
change (rho = 0.635). Another example confirming the CIT relationships 
between extent and coherence of governance regimes, the motivation, 
cognitions and resources of actors and the policy results, can be found in 
a separate study on Greece and the implementation of the EU Water 
Framework Directive (Kampa, 2007).
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3.5 Governance flexibility and intensity as requirements for 
adaptive management
Extent and coherence have been shown to be important regime qualities 
in more or less steady state situations or when one wants to compare the 
before and after examples of policy transfers in water management. 
Following the general acceptance of the integrative ambitions of IWRM it 
was observed that the increased complexity leads to uncertainty and 
unpredictability and that water management thus needs to be prepared to 
avoid threats and use opportunities as they arise. This includes trying not 
only to see the reality as a field of obstacles, but also as a terrain of potential 
– often unexpected – opportunities and being adaptive enough to use 
every ‘window of opportunity’ to bring the ultimate purpose closer to 
realization. Sometimes the above is called Adaptive Water Management 
(AWM) (Lulofs and Bressers, 2010), though others emphasize the adaptive 
capacity of the water system itself as a core issue of this approach (Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2005). In a highly dynamic process situation in which success 
depends on quick and timely adaptive action, new regime qualities 
become important for supporting water management processes. Thus 
also the success of transferred policy options is partly dependent on the 
degree to which such governance regime qualities are reinforced or 
hampered. This section provides a description of the value added when 
flexibility and intensity are added as regime qualities when studying 
complex and dynamic policy processes and the role of policy transfers 
therein.
First, flexibility is important as it indicates to what degree the relevant 
actors have formal and informal liberties and stimuli to act. The attention 
given to the flexibility of the regime is approached on the basis of the 
documentation about the regime elements, as well as from a bottom up 
perspective. Success and failure factors of the actual projects can be 
rightfully attributed to inflexibilities in provincial, national and ultimately 
supranational policies. What is also interesting is how the latter are 
moderated by national and subnational regimes.
Flexibility as defined in de Boer and Bressers (2011, p. 92) is ‘the degree 
to which the regime elements support and facilitate adaptive actions and 
strategies in as far as the integrated (among others multi-sectoral) ambitions 
are served by this adaptiveness’. Consequently it is also the degree to which 
hindrances for such adaptive behaviour are avoided. The addition ‘in as far 
as …’ is needed to discern governance and policy that is just weak from a 
genuine attempt to make the most of the situation. The term ‘integrated 
(among others multi-sectoral) ambitions’ refers here to the integrated 
multifunctionality of the various interests that exist in the project or policy 
arena. In cases of water policy transfer, there are likely to be many other 
non-water-related interests that will be affected throughout the policy 
process and as a result of the resource use arrangement that is in place 
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following implementation. Thus, the context will determine to what extent 
new and existing uses need to be reconciled during this process.
The value of flexibility must be understood in connection with the level 
of the other qualities also present in the regime. Flexibility needs at least a 
certain degree of coherence to be built upon. Otherwise, when it is just 
extensive discretion and self-reliance for water managers there is a high risk 
that a fragmented and a weak form of water management would result.
The flexibility of the regime can be described in terms of the five elements 
of governance. The following paragraphs elaborate on flexibility in terms of 
the five aspects of governance (see also de Boer (2012) for further 
development of this concept):
1 A regime is more flexible in as far as the relationships between the 
levels and scales involved are more based on decentralization of power, 
without upper levels withdrawing support. This is closely related to 
empowering rather than controlling relations, and thus on trust.
2 A similar feature describes flexible regimes in terms of actor relations 
in the policy network. The combination of giving leeway to each actor 
group to optimize its contribution to the whole programme while still 
viewing the programme as a joint effort qualifies as flexibility.
3 In terms of general problem perception and goal ambitions flexibility 
implies that these in their variety are not only integrated into a sort of 
common denominator (like with coherence), but also that these 
mixtures are allowed to be different in emphasis according to the 
opportunities of the context in the various concrete situations. This 
implies some acceptance of uncertainty and openness to emergent 
options, which again relates to trust.
4 The instruments and their combinations in policy strategies or mixes 
are more flexible in as far as means from different sources (like public 
policies and private property rights) may be used as well as indirect 
means (here relating to opening or improving options for the use of 
means that more directly serve the goals) are available and allowed to 
be used.
5 The flexibility of the organization responsible for the implementation 
– the responsibilities and resources given by the policy programme(s) 
– can be measured by the discretion available to pool resources like 
funds and people with those of others to serve integrated projects and 
to be held accountable on the basis of the balanced virtues of the 
achievements (as in an integrated project), rather than on the basis of 
separate performance criteria.
There is often a highly dynamic and change-oriented nature to many 
policies that aim to improve general water governance processes or the 
use of water resources. This is the case since water management often 
influences many societal issues related to health, economic development, 
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environ mental resilience etc. As such, there is yet another regime quality 
that can be influential for the practical process of implementing water 
related policies. That is the obvious, but no less important aspect of intensity. 
Intensity is ‘the degree to which the regime elements urge changes in the 
status quo or in current developments’ (de Boer and Bressers, 2011, p. 93). 
The ‘amount of change’ is thereby measured in analogy with Newton’s ‘law 
of inertia’, respect to the degree of energy it takes to produce the change. 
In systems theory, induced changes will typically meet negative feedback 
loops, weakening their impact, while in some cases positive feedback loops 
creating dynamics for permanent change are also conceivable (True et al., 
1999; Bressers and Lulofs, 2009). In policy studies terms, intensity is related 
to the size of the task that is required to create new dynamics by creative 
cooperation, or conflict. Conservative motivations often need to be changed 
or overruled by power. Cognitive boundary judgements regarding the issues 
at stake require broadening. New resources need to be made available and 
combined with old ones. In other words: with more intensity the urge to use 
clever adaptive strategies to deal with and change the setting of the process 
increases.
The five elements of governance can also be used to highlight the 
important intensity related aspects of the governance regime. By doing so 
we find that:
1 Intensity is greater in as far as upper levels are more deeply involved.
2 Actors that are also powerful in other domains are more deeply involved 
in the relevant policy network for the issue at stake.
3 The issue plays a larger role in the public debate leading to a greater 
openness to try to push developments away from a business-as-usual 
track (thus with more ambitious goals).
4 The instruments made available to be used include more interventionist 
ones.
5 The amount of resources made available for implementation is larger. 
(See also de Boer (2012) for further development of this concept.)
We acknowledge that there is an implicit potential tension between this 
‘quality’ of the regime and the previous one of flexibility. This is related to 
the eternal dilemma of the ‘quest for control’ involving distrust, versus the 
‘learning while doing approach’ involving trust. When an actor wants to 
achieve a great deal of change this can increase the distrustful tendency to 
try to control the related or influencing processes from the top down, which 
leads to a decrease in the flexibility. However in complex and dynamic 
situations decreasing flexibility is often detrimental since arising 
opportunities are missed or not created and developing obstacles often 
cannot be foreseen. However when there is sufficient trust in the 
implementers’ motivation to genuinely work on the matter, flexibility in 
the governance regime can be an important resource.
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When the change striven for is multidimensional, e.g. involving multiple 
policy sectors, synergies should be welcomed and trade-offs accepted when 
necessary (de Boer et al., 2011). While in its definition ‘flexibility’ is shielded 
from mere discretion that would also accept implementers doing nothing, 
there remains a natural limit to flexibility as a positive force. When multiple 
policy sectors are involved in the water management process, an integrated 
vision is helpful for guiding the process, preventing extreme imbalances 
(coherence) or the exclusion of essential sectors (extent). Inevitably there 
will be some limitations to flexibility induced by this. Here the regime 
quality of flexibility is restricted to a certain degree by the regime quality of 
(multi-sectoral) interregime extent and coherence.
Some last assertions of Contextual Interaction Theory specified here are:
h While the extent and coherence are crucial qualities of the structural 
context when stabilization and protection of a resource is attempted 
through the policy intervention, other qualities should be added when 
change and the creation of new resources are desired.
i The first additional quality is the flexibility of the regime; the degree to 
which the regime allows and facilitates the case-specific variation and 
boundary spanning strategies of actors needed for adaptive management 
in as far as the change ambitions are served by this adaptiveness. Under 
the conditions of sufficient motivation of the implementers and 
sufficient interregime extent and coherence more flexibility will lead to 
better adaptive strategies and thereby to improved results.
j The second additional quality is the intensity: to what degree is the 
change striven for a deviation from ‘business as usual’? The greater the 
intensity, the more resistance that will have to be overcome (negative 
feedback loops), but sometimes also more enthusiasm can be provoked 
(positive feedback loops).
3.6 Adaptive strategies to deal with complex and dynamic settings
The use of adaptive management is presented as an essential remedy for 
the problems seen around the world related to access to and management 
of water (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2005; Bressers and Lulofs, 2010b). This adaptive 
management is itself however not a process without its own internal struggles 
and various strategies exist with which to accomplish its end goals. The 
strategies that develop can be a response to unsatisfactory processes, though 
with experienced actors they can also be preventative, attempting to avoid 
an unproductive setting before it becomes a fixed context for the ensuing 
process. Such strategies rarely have a ‘the more the better’ character. In fact 
their (degree of) application needs to be continuously balanced with the 
evolving threats and opportunities of the context, that often itself is in flux 
for more reasons than deliberate strategies of the actors involved. These 
strategies can involve more than just the motivations, cognitions and 
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resources concerning the issues at stake. The actors can also try to change 
the specific context of the process. Sometimes it is possible to bring in new 
actors or exclude existing ones or try to redefine the process and its relevant 
issues differently to shift it to another arena with a (partially) different 
governance context (see for an elaboration Bressers and Lulofs, 2010a, pp. 
27–30). Some examples which have been observed are:
1 adding new actors; these can include policy brokers or ‘inviting oneself’ 
to consultations among other actors on new plans, or more generally 
keeping regular interaction with other potentially relevant actors even 
when no immediate issue is calling for attention, this way providing 
better network relationships not on the level of the general governance 
context but much closer to the level of the specific case;
2 creating new arenas by adding new meeting points such as through the 
choice of a particular administrative setting (e.g. a voluntary process or 
under the institutional setting of a certain law) for the process when 
possible or by installing working groups or committees;
3 creating new cognitions by introducing new information, spreading 
information and perceptions by new catchy key words and metaphors, 
involving the media etc. (compare van Buuren, 2006);
4 creating new motivations by creating salience among others through 
luring with resources, or by promoting with positive intermediate 
results; and
5 adding new resources and power bases for instance by exchanging 
relatively flexible ones (like money) in advance for relatively fixed or 
scarce ones, such as land ownership.
The use of strategies is often not deliberate or precise. Understanding of 
strategic options must be accompanied by the presence of the necessary 
and efficient tools. These options also require skilful actors to enable their 
meaningful exploitation (Hermans, 2005). In complex systems, many 
developments are ‘emergent’; quite unpredictable consequences of a 
multiplicity of factors and circumstances. Consequently, the use of strategies 
is often spontaneous and time-pressured. Moreover, it can be quite wise to 
simultaneously use diverse strategies and include a degree of ‘redundancy’ 
in order to create fall-back options when one of the strategies does not have 
its intended or desired effect, as the literature also states about water 
management institutions (Constanza et al., 2001; Low et al., 2003; Ostrom, 
2005). While it is important to keep various water management options 
open as long as possible, in order to provide a sufficient degree of 
accountability towards elected representatives, it is necessary to work within 
an agreed dynamic framework for various stages of action (Koppenjan et al., 
2009). Such accountability need not be at the expense of organizational 
capacity when the performance criteria are under reflexive adjustment and 
do not remain fixed regardless of new situations (Pires, 2011). ‘Good water 
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management will only become a reality once we recognize that water 
managers have complex duties’ (Figuères et al., 2003).
Vinke-de Kruijf and Özerol discuss in Chapter 2 some insights from the 
realm of technology transfer that were later applied to the realm of water 
resources management. When we look at the strategies that actors in 
dynamic situations apply to themselves internally, by trying to prepare 
themselves to take advantage of these opportunities for improved interaction 
in complex settings, we see these concepts as connecting these two aspects 
of the policy transfer and water management implementation process. 
Internal strategies are seen as an attempt to increase the actor’s receptivity. 
Jeffrey and Seaton (2004) coined the term receptivity as not only dependent 
on the degree of exposure to new knowledge, but also more specifically on 
the way the actor can associate and exploit new knowledge around existing 
knowledge, activities and objectives. This requires that the actor ‘lets the 
outside come in’, and can open and regroup their understandings to 
include reckoning with the new knowledge. Thus, receptivity is not a form 
of passiveness or weakness. It is a form of alertness and openness towards 
the context that enables well-targeted innovative and adaptive action by 
self-confident people and organizations.
Receptivity tends to play a major role in recognizing the opportunities 
that can be seen due to the enlarged domain perception and then used to 
create synergies with the activities of other actors. If both parties perceive 
potential synergy, meaning that they see joint chances for cooperation, 
boundary spanning is more likely to create productive linkages (Bressers 
and Kuks, 2004, pp. 259–262). This perception in turn reinforces the degree 
of openness towards enlarged domain boundaries. If one or both parties 
consider the situation purely as rivalry or even mutually exclusive, one 
might even observe attempts to reinforce existing boundaries or bring up 
new boundaries in order to keep domains apart or separate them. Jeffrey 
and Seaton (2004) discern four phases of receptivity that can also be seen 
as permanent variables: awareness, association, acquisition and application 
(see also Bressers, 2011). In the cognitive system, these can be linked to, 
respectively, the observations, the filtering through frames of reference 
(including boundary judgements on what belongs to the subject of the 
process at stake and what not), the interpretations of reality and the impacts 
of the cognitive system on motivation, capacity and the process itself.
For the purposes of understanding the specific aspects of implementing 
a transferred water policy in a multidisciplinary and functional context, we 
use an expanded definition of receptivity:
the ability to combine new information with existing cognitions, to 
recognize new goals as matching existing motivations or the values behind 
them and to recognize the opportunities of new resources or combi-
nations with existing resources to optimize their capacity and power
(De Boer and Bressers, 2011, p. 90)
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A greater likelihood for productive interaction processes under one of the 
various combinations of motivations, cognitions and resources of the actors 
involved might result from an increase in such receptivity.
Receptivity can be both a quality of people and organizations. While we 
typically describe receptivity as an organizational characteristic, we 
acknowledge the importance of skilled, experienced and open-minded 
project managers that fulfil important roles as ‘boundary spanners’. The 
receptivity of an organization is partly important to enable them to fulfil 
this function.
Like the arena and constellation of actors and their characteristics, the 
receptivity of an organization is not entirely fixed and can thus be altered in 
the course of time by external factors and deliberate internal strategies. It is 
crucial that an organizational philosophy is oriented towards external 
cooperation for instance through rewarding project managers that are 
communicative, flexible and entrepreneurial.
Summarizing this section, some further assertions in CIT are:
k The rules of the game that e.g. provide or restrict resources are often 
not static but themselves subject to change partly by external strategies by 
actors in the process unless they are firmly fixed by the regime. The 
same holds for the actor constellation in the process.
l The setting of actor characteristics that impacts on the course and 
result of the process is not only dynamic due to external factors, but can 
also to some extent be manipulated by clever external strategies of the 
actors during the process (these are often forms of ‘boundary spanning’ 
– see Bressers and Lulofs, 2010b).
m Since adaptive boundary spanning strategies often require concerted 
actions by more than one individual person, this also draws attention to 
the internal organization of the actor (‘actors’ in most analyses are in 
fact ‘corporate actors’: organizations or parts of organizations). Here 
the receptivity of these actors and actor organi zations is relevant.
n This receptivity can also be positively influenced by internal strategies of 
actor organizations, which promote continuous learning, consciously 
dealing with uncertainty, and stimulating mutually supportive 
intraorganizational relations.
3.7 Concluding remarks: contextual factors set the conditions for 
policy and knowledge transfers
Understanding the various impacts from various perspectives and 
influencing factors – particularly in the complex policy realm of water 
governance – is highly dependent on context. The task stressed here is to 
develop an approach which assists us in knowing ‘what works, where, when 
and how in transferring lessons in water management?’ By being open to a 
large variety of contextual factors, but nonetheless channelling them 
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through a limited number of ‘core characteristics’ that build a deductive 
explanatory framework, the approach that is provided in this chapter strives 
to achieve an understanding of the water management implementation 
processes which is simultaneously concise and more generally applicable. 
This framework supports an assessment of the degree to which policy 
transfers can be viewed as improvements that contribute to, rather than 
hamper, successful water management.
Reasons for using such a framework include being able to see the 
influence of different characteristics which arise from varying contexts and 
how they play a prominent role in the final product without attempting to 
cancel out the important local effects. The context is not only important in 
as far as how it impacts the original intent of the policy, but also gives it a 
place of importance in the expectation of the more widely defined preferred 
outcome. This form of utility is key to understanding the process and 
influences on the given actors involved in the transfer and implementation 
processes. Importantly, this model can also be used to describe the various 
interactions and influences between the actor (organization) of interest 
and other actors, regime contents and qualities under dynamic conditions 
and can focus on the impacts of these dynamics.
The policy process as seen to occur between the external context and the 
target actors is explored to show how the receptivity (characterized by 
awareness, association, acquisition, adoption) of the target organization 
can work as a catalyst to align the external and internal contexts to enable 
successful implementation of transferred policy options. Changes in context 
occur continually in any policy process due to the complexity of the regime 
or the dynamic nature with which actors interact.
The model developed in this chapter is used by a number of authors in 
the following chapters of this book in their explorations of particular 
experiences in knowledge and policy transfer in the field of water 
governance. It is thus provided here as a basis upon which different cases 
can be compared, however a number of the chapters make use of other 
appropriate models and frameworks. We have encouraged the use of 
these different approaches in this book and provide some conclusions in 
the final chapter about the value of having a number of different lenses 
from which to view contemporary water governance practices as well as 
the plethora of real-world case examples. The following chapters in this 
book provide insights on cases where policy and knowledge transfers are 
being undertaken as a way of addressing global and local water resource 
use and management challenges. This chapter presents a way of thinking 
about what happens when these policies take hold of resources and 
attention through more local implementation actions and water 
management projects.
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